Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit Practices by Wilbur C. Plummer & Ralph A. Young
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit Practices





Chapter Title: Competitive Relations
Chapter Author: Wilbur C. Plummer, Ralph A. Young
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5665
Chapter pages in book: (p. 257 - 288)11
CompetitiveRelations
THE competitive situation in the sales finance business is
greatly complicated by the fact that manufacturer and dealer,
as well as consumer, have an interest in the services rendered.
Competition takes forms quite different from what might be
expected if the transaction were effected directly between
sales finance company and the purchaser of the commodity
financed, with no other interests to be satisfied. The business
is characterized by highly competitive practices, but many
of these benefit the dealer rather than the consumer; all are
potentially of interest to the manufacturer, but his affiliation
with the sales finance process is itself a varying factor, and a
further element in the competitive situation.
The importance of automobile financing in the business
of sales finance companies justifies disproportionate atten-
tion to competitive relations in that field. This chapter, there-
fore, is concerned primarily with automobile financing, a
more summary discussion sufficing in the Held of diversified
commodities. The competitive situation amOng sales finance
companies will be analyzed as a problem with three different
centers, as stressed above—consumer, manufacturer, dealer—
and a final section will consider how the sales finance business
as a whole is affected by the competition of other agencies of
consumer instalment credit.
THE CONSUMER'S INTEREST AS A COMPETITIVE
FACTOR IN AUTOMOBILE FINANCING
The aspects of a sales finance transaction which are, or might
be expected to be, of interest to the consumer are primarily
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the finance company's credit standards and procedures, its
contract terms and finance charges, and the insurance cover-
age for the commodity purchased. In these matters practice
varies among the different companies, and is susceptible to
the pressures of competition.
It is not primarily the consumer, however, who has led the
finance companies to compete with one another in regard to
these aspects of the transaction. As a general rule the con-
sumer is mainly interested in acquiring immediate posses-
sion of the commodity he is purchasing, and he seldom has
either the knowledge or the inclination to explore the tech-
nical aspects of the transaction. Many consumers find it an
embarrassing matter to go into debt for a purchase, and prefer
to conduct their financing arrangements with a minimum of
conversation; for others it is a matter of convenience to ac-
cept a suggested company without question rather than spend
time shopping around for more advantageous arrangements.
Moreover, as often as not the consumer is entirely ignorant
of alternative sources of credit available to him, and even if
he knows of them he is likely to be unable to estimate rela-
tive costs and merits.
In regard to the charges imposed by finance companies, it
has already been mentioned that even a considerable change
in rate results in only a slight percentage difference in total
time price. It would appear that this fact has some bearing
on the nature of demand for sales financing services. Experi-
enced salesmen report that the consumer is typically more
interested in the total time price, and the size of the monthly
payments into which it is divided after he has made his down
payment, than he is in the finance charge as such, and that
he is not generally interested at all in the components of the
finance charge. Especially to the higher-income instalment
purchaser even an increase of 15 or 20 percent in finance
charge may be seen not as an additional several dollars of
financing expense but merely as an insignificant increase—COMPETITIVE RELATIONS 259
probably less than 1 percent—in the cost of his purchase, and
as an insignificant addition—probably around 25 or 50 cents
—to his monthly payment. And a decrease of such propor-
tions may be similarly disregarded, since the total investment
is already so large that a few dollars' saving is considered rela-
tively immaterial. Such purchasers' unresponsiveness to price
fluctuations undoubtedly reduces the incentive of sales finance
companies to engage in finance charge competition, particu-
larly in periods of business depression when lower-income
purchasers, to whom even small economies are important, are
relatively less numerous.
In this connection it is important to remember that in any
one community there is but a small number of companies
competing for the business, and that there are great
ties among them in financial strength and in geographical
scope of operations—factors which also tend to decrease the
freeplay of competition. Since salesfinance companies
obtain their business not directly from consumers but through
the mediation of retail dealers, price competition is further
restrained by the difficulties of making price changes known
to consumers. is indication, however, that conditions
of competition are being modified, and the result may be that
the consumer will become a more active element in determin-
ing price.
The inefficacy of consumers, as a group, in influencing the
conditions of finance company competition should not be
interpreted to mean that the consumer has in all respects had
to accept whatever arrangements were offered him. In the
first place, he is a highly important focus of competition
among dealers. The purchase of an automobile, whether for
cash or on instalment terms, contains many possibilities for
bargaining, especially in regard to the trade-in value of an old
car. To the individual consumer an automobile is usually
an important purchase, to be undertaken with some care. The
amount he is allowed for his old car is to him a big consid-260 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
eration in determining where he will buy his new car, and
therefore he shops around among dealers, and bargains with
them, until he receives an offer that seems to. him to involve
no reflection on his business sense. This dickering is made
possible by the inevitable lack of standardization in the value
of used cars, and in this part of the transaction the dealer is
at a disadvantage: he is not yet sure of his customer and,
with other dealers competing with him, he knows that he has
to make sometimes unwise compromises on trade-ins in order
to close the all-important sale of another car.
To be sure, the dealer has several ways of compensating
his frequent losses on trade-ins. In some cases he has been
able to increase the price of the new car. In instalment trans-
actions his various participations in the finance charges may
also make up to him for any loss he has taken on the deal;
these participations will be discussed presently, in relation to
the dealer's role in finance company competition. But the fact
remains that the lack of standardization in used-car values,
and the consumer's natural inclination to take advantage of
this situation, have a significant bearing on the conditions
that prevail in automobile instalment financing. It is not
possible to say how greatly these conditions would change if
trade-in practices could be standardized, but certainly in that
case at least one reason for high charges would be removed.
Ininstalmenttransactions the dealer may be pressed by
the consumer into compromises also on other aspects of the
deal, primarily down payment and length of contract, and
here too he may jeopardize his own interests if he goes too
far, for the finance company may require a full-recourse or
repurchase arrangement on a contract whose terms are too
far below standard. On charges he is less likely to compromise,
for there he must make up the difference directly out of his
own pocket, with no possibility of compensation elsewhere.
Even in regard to finance charges, however, the consumer,
while not an essential focus of finance company competition,COMPETITIVE RELATIONS 261
has not been entirely without influence. The finance com-
panies have had to consider the fact that a consumer who
contemplates an instalment purchase, even if he does not
typically show much concern about what is offered him, is
certainly not wholly indifferent to the price of the
tion, and that If he regards it as out of reason he may insist
on other financing facilities or even withdraw from the mar-
ket. Moreover, advertising by consumer credit agencies, in
which the national sales finance companies also engage, is
making the consumer somewhat more aware of charges and
contract terms. Finally, as will be discussed presently, the
manufacturer has an interest in seeing that financing arrange-
ments are kept sufficiently reasonable that he can count on
instalment as well as cash purchasers for his cars. Thus the
consumer, while not important as a direct incentive to com-
petition in retail sales financing, has benefited somewhat
from competitive action.
These benefits pertain mainly to finance charges and in-
surance, but the effects of competitive action in .regard to
these items will be discussed in relation to the manufacturer's
participation in the process of sales financing.
THE MANUFACTURER'S INTEREST AS A COMPETITIVE
FACTOR IN AUTOMOBILE FINANCING
To the manufacturer of automobiles instalment financing is
an important instrument for selling his product: wholesale
financing enables him to receive payment from deal-
ers, and thus conserve his own cash resources; and retail
financing opens for him a wider consumer market. Itis
equally to his interest, however, that in the provision of the
financing service no undue advantage be taken of the pur-
chaser, for ill-will resulting from sharp practices is likely to
be directed at him as well as the finance company, and finan-
cial difficulties of dealers hamper the distribution of his262 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
product. This means that the manufacturer himself has an
interest in seeing that a uniform financing plan is offered to
his prospective purchasers, that charges are competitively
low and standard, and that reasonable facilities are available
to care for the wholesale financing of dealers. The following
discussion of manufacturer relationships is based to a con-
siderable extent on material in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's report on the automobile industry.
The degree to which a manufacturer may participate in
the retail and wholesale instalment financing of automobiles
is at present an undecided question. In the past—in fact,
until very recently—his relationship to the business has taken
the form either of direct ownership of a finance company
subsidiary to his factory, or of special arrangements entered
into with a particular finance company. Today there is only
one factory-controlled sales finance company engaged in
financing retail and wholesale purchases of passenger auto-
mobiles—General Motors Acceptance Corporation, organized
in 1919 and wholly owned by General Motors. In 1928 the
Ford Motor Company formed Universal Credit Corporation
for the purpose of financing the retail and wholesale pur-
chase of Ford cars, and Ford officials declared that a specific
intention in the formation of this organization was that it
might serve as a yardstick for determining justifiable finance
charges on the products of the parent company.1 This finance
company continued under Ford ownership until 1933; at that
time, however, the majority of its voting stock was sold to
Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, although it con-
tinued to concentrate on the financing of Ford products.
Until 1938 two finance companies were factory-preferred,
that is, they operated under special agreements with various
manufacturers: Commercial Credit Company; and Commer-
cial Investment Trust Corporation, with its subsidiary, Uni-
versal Credit Corporation. The two factory-preferred corn-
Federal Trade Commission,. Report on Motor Vehicle Industry (1939) p.660.COMPETITIVE RELATIONS 263
panics and the one that is factory-controlled may be referred
to jointly as factory-related. All three are national in scope;
the regional and local companies have been for the most part
independent, of wider or narrower range of operation.
The division of business between factory-related and inde-
pendent companies is indicated in Table 67, for the year
1937. This table covers the total automobile instalment paper
handled by 424 sales finance companies, these companies to-
gether accounting for more than 95 percent of all such paper
handled by sales finance companies. Of the total volume of
automobile paper handled in 1937 by these 424 companies,
about 73 percent went to the three factory-related companies.
Thus on the average each of these companies received about
one-fourth of all automobile business handled by sales finance
companies—twelve hundred times as much as the average for
each' of the 424 companies2 and seven times as much as the
average for each of the three regionals, which were the largest
competitors of the factory-related companies. It is worth not-
iñg that the latter received a higher proportion of wholesale
than of retail business—79 as compared with 68 percent of
the total—whereas the other companies received less of the
wholesale than of the retail paper, and in decreasing ratio
with decreasing size of the companies.
In any particular locality, of course, the relative position
of the various types of companies may have been quite dif-
ferent from that indicated in Table 67. In a given area two
or fifty companies may have been competing for the available
business—or there may have been only one, or even none.
Thus it may be that within a certain territory a smaller com-
pany had a dominant position in the local market. But
2These424 sales finance companies handled about 71 percent of all retail
automobile financing in 1937, the other 29 percent going to an unknown num-
ber of other credit agencies (including a negligible few sales finance companies
not reporting to the Department of Commerce). Of the total volume of such
paper handled by all agencies in 1937, about 49 percent went to the factory.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































through the country as a whole there is no doubt that the
greatest volume of business has been conducted by the factory-
related companies.
The degree to which the facilities of the factory-related
finance companies have been used by General Motors, Ford
and Chrysler dealers is indicated in Table 68. It appears from
these data that about half of General Motors, one-quarter of
Ford and one-fifth of Chrysler dealers have used almost solely
the facilities of their factories' respective finance companies.
About one-eighth of General Motors, more than one-third of
Ford and half of Chrysler dealers reported no use of the
factory-related finance companies, or replied indefinitely.
TABLE 68
PERCENTAGE DIsTRIBuTION OF GENERAL MOTORS,
FORD AND CHRYSLER DEALERS, BY DEGREE TO WHICH
THEY USED FACILITIES OF FACTORY-RELATED FINANCE
COMPANIESS












Practically entirely 53 26 19
50—90 percent 23 16 17
Less than 50 percent 11 21 15
No use, or replies indefinite 13 37 49
TOTAL 100 100 100
Based on Federal Trade Commission, Report on Motor Vehicle Industry
(1939) P. 281. Number of dealers reporting not disclosed in the report, nor the
dates to which these figures apply. In response to an inquiry the Federal Trade
Commission has stated: "These percentages are based on replies received
in response to a questionnaire sent to the automobile dealers in the fall
of 1938. They cover whatever periods the various dealers have handled
the products of General Motors, Ford çr Chrysler. Some, therefore, may
cover only a few months, possibly subsequent tothe action ofthe. De-
partment of Justice against the three large finance companies, while others
cover a number of years prior to that action." The factory.related finance
companies are as follows: for General Motors, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation; for Ford, Universal Credit Corporation;for Chrysler, Com-
mercial Credit Company.266 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
The special arrangements made by a manufacturer with a
preferred. finance company usually provided that the latter
would finance the wholesale purchases of the factory's dealers
and would offer retail purchasers an "approved plan" of
financing, evolved by the manufacturer with the avowed pur-
pose of providing relatively low-cost and uniform facilities
for instalment credit. The manufacturer, in turn, endeavored
to influence his dealers to use, and to recommend to their
customers, the facilities of the preferred company. Thus the
finance company benefited through increased business and
the manufacturer benefited through the fact that his dealers
and potential customers were offered what were regarded as
attractive financing facilities.
It was customary, however, to supplement, or guarantee,
these benefits by specific financial arrangements. Thus, under
the various contracts between Chrysler Corporation and
Commercial Credit Company, Chrysler agreed to pay the
latter the difference between its aggregate automobile finance
charges, at rates and terms prescribed by Chrysler, and the
amount of finance charges that would otherwise have been
in force. The finance company, in turn, agreed to pay Chrys-
ler a portion of its profits. This resulted in payments by
Chrysler in 1927 and .1928, totaling $1,474,000 for the two
years, and in payments by the finance company to Chrysler
in each year from 1929 through 1937, totaling $3,820,000
for the nine years and ranging from $39,000 in 1932 to
$1,339,000 in
Hudson Motor Car Company entered into contractual ar-
rangements with Commercial Investment Trust, Inc.,in
1922, under which the finance company was paid subsidies
for the retail and wholesale financing of the cars of this manu-
facturer. From 1923 through 1932 the finance company re-
ceived $1,471,000 in such payments.4
8FederalTrade Commission, op. cit., p.615
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TheStudebaker Corporation became interested in the
financing requirements of its dealers as early as 1915, when
it arranged for certain local banks to extend accommodations
to Studebaker dealers in amounts totaling the amount of
deposits made by Studebaker in the banks. In 1916 the Cor-
poration arranged that Commercial Investment Trust, Inc.,
should extend credit to dealers, and agreed to absorb all
losses from uncollectible accounts. Since 1919 Studebaker
has had agreements with three finance companies, each at a
different time, providing for wholesale and retail financing
of purchases. No subsidies were paid, however, until 1923,
when financing rates were set by Studebaker; payments were
made each year from 1923 through 1932, totaling $5,728,000
and ranging from $44,000 in 1932 to $925,000 in 1925. After
1932 contractual arrangements with finance companies were
continued but no subsidies were paid.5
Some indication of the effect of manufacturer efforts to
keep charges low is contained in data presented in Chapter
8. It was shown there6 that on both new cars and used cars
the factory-related companies' finance charges were lower,
in annual percentage rate, than those .of the independents.
Chapter 8 showed also that in 1936-38 the new-car charges
of all types of companies (except the independents, on 24-
month contracts) were substantially lower, in annual per-
centage rates, than they had been in 1935. This general de-
crease in the average rates on new cars was primarily the
result of General Motors' announcement of the "6 percent"
plan in the fall of The plan reduced charges on new
cars by 25 percent on 12-month contracts and 19 percent on
pp. 817-18. 01 the total amount paid out, $4,845,000wentto In-
dustrial Finance Corporation (parent company of the Morris Plan system
of industrial banking companies) and its subsidiary, Industrial Acceptance
Corporation (1923-28); Motor Dealers Credit Corporation received $218,000
(1928-29); and Commercial Investment Trust, Inc., received $665,000 (1929.32).
6Chapter8, Tables 55 and 56.
See Chapter 8, pp. 201 if.268 SALES FiNANCE COMPANIES
18-month contracts,8 and the other finance companies an-
nounced competing plans as quickly as they could be devised
and publicized. It may be noteworthy that for the factory-
preferred and independent companies the insurance per-
centages (insurance in percent of cash selling price and in
percent of original unpaid balance plus insurance) were
noticeably higher in 1936-38, at least on 12-month and 18-
month contracts, than they had been in 1935, before the
finance charge reduction. The possible inaccuracies in these
insurance percentages should be borne in mind, however.
The Federal Trade Commission decision on the 6 percent
plan has already been discussed. In its report on the auto-
mobile industry the Commission declared that this plan may
be said to constitute one step "in what is possibly a vicious
circle":the manufacturers built up their relations with
finance companies partly in order to reduce the time-sales
price of their cars; the discounts which the manufacturers
allowed to dealers were considered by the latter to be inade-
quate; the dealers were therefore tempted to pack the finance
charge to add to their profits; the factory-related finance com-
panies sought to eliminate the packs; some dealers retaliated
by switching their business to finance companies that would
allow them to pack the finance charge; and finally with the
6 percent plan GMAC went directly to the public, as it were,'
hoping to educate consumers to compute finance charges for
themselves and to compare them with alternatives, thus dis-
closing the packed charges and making it even more difficult
for the independent companies to obtain additional business
or retain what they already had.9 The independent com-
panies contended that if manufacturers had not discriminated
against them, but had permitted the free play of competition
among all finance companies, this competition would have
8FederalTrade Commission, cit., pp.972,975.
°Ibid., pp.943-44.COMPETITIVE RELATIONS 269
reduced finance charges at least as much as they were reduced
under the preferential system.'°
The manufacturer's interest in the financing process has
had some effect also on the charges for insurance. As has
already been mentioned, the factory-controlled company,
GMAC, places its insurance with the General Exchange In-
surance Corporation—also owned by General Motors Cor-
poration—and the rates it files with state insurance depart-
ments are lower than manual rates by about 25 percent, the
difference being passed on to the purchaser."
Many other sales finance companies own their own insur-
ance companies—it has been estimated that at least 80 per-.
cent of the volume of premiums from retail financing now
flows through wholly owned insurance companies—but the
general practice is to quote only manual rates. Thus the
other finance companies, where they wish to compete with
GMAC on a price basis, must offset this disadvantage. Their
markets overlap with GMAC's, however, only where they at-
tempt to receive the business of General Motors dealers, for
it is only the paper of these dealers that GMAC purchases.
• Theinsurance "package" provided on different transac-
tions. varies considerably—some transactions carrying single-
interest and others double-interest insurance, some carrying
protection for collision and others not—and the various pos-
sible combinations result in decidedly different services.
Where policies are issued to the purchaser the protection
bought and the amount of the premium are ordinarily stated
clearly. This may be done also when certificates are issued,
but many finance companies using this method have not
shown the insurance premium separate from the finance
'°Ibid.,pp. 944-45.
Late in September GMAC organized a special insurance company,
the Motors Insurance Corporation, which is under the same management as
General Exchange Insurance Corporation. This company does business at
manual rates in California, Oregon and Washington, where state laws permit
dealers to receive insurance commissions, but itis reported that where its
facilities are used there is a corresponding reduction in finance charges.270 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
charge, or stated the coverage in a clear fashion. This lack
of uniformity has presented a for the companies
which offered the most insurance protection per dollar of
premium. The purchaser's ignorance has often worked to the
disadvantage of the company offering him the best value.
The factory-related companies' affiliations with manufac-
turers have been strongly opposed by the independent com-
panies as unfair competition,'2 on the ground that such or-
ganizational relationships operated to divert the flow of
paper from them, not by providing superior service but by
coercing and discriminating against dealers. The independent
companies, through the medium of the American Finance
Conference, contended that factory services, such as advertis-
ing of authorized finance plans and providing the aid of
factory representatives in soliciting business for the affiliated
companies, greatly reduced the latter's acquisition expenses,
and were a powerful influence in diverting paper in their di-
rection. In support of this position the American Finance
Conference quoted a prospectus of Commercial Credit Com-
pany, issued June 16, 1937, in connection with a debenture
note issue: "The services performed by Chrysler Corporation
and its subsidiaries are believed to be a valuable advertise-
ment of Commercial Credit Company and its business, plans
and financing facilities, to save the Company a substantial
sum in promoting and acquiring additional business from
dealers, and to increase its business and profits."3
In its extreme form factory assistance was said to constitute
dealer coercion by such methods as: "1. Refusal of independ-
ent finance company checks at the factory to cover wholesale
loans to dealers when they take delivery of cars; 2. Delayed
delivery of body types needed; 3. Forced delivery of other
12Thisand the following expositionofthe independent finance com-
panies'positionistaken from "The Automobile FinanceBusiness,"a
mimeographed monograph of the American Finance Conference, Chicago
(July 15, 1937).
13 ibid., pp. 4, 13.COMPETITIVE RELATIONS 271
types not wanted; 4. Delayed delivery of any type of car at
time of introduction of new models; 5. Threat of cancel-
lation of franchise; 6. Multiple° dealer representation with-
out economic justification;7. Various and sundry dealer
persecutions."4
The independents contended also15 that the factory-related
companies had access to funds at lower rates, that if the dif-
ference was not passed on to the public the result was higher
profits, and that if it was passed on to the public the result
was a reduction in rates "to the point where competition
from independent finance companies disappears and a virtual
monopoly without regulation ensues." The independents
held that a borrowing position which was improved by fac-
tory affiliation was "nothing less than a case of indirect
subsidy."
Through the American Finance Conference the indepen-
dent companies brought these allegations to the attention of
the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. In
September 1937, after an investigation of the complaint, the
Department institUted criminal proceedings in the Federal
Court at Milwaukee against General Motors Corporation,
Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, their associated
finance companies and certain officials of the companies. In
December the grand jury was dismissed on the ground that
the government had been guilty of impropriety in holding
discussions with representatives of the parties under inves-
tigation in order to arrange for a. civil remedy in the form
of consent decrees; these discussions had been held at the re-
quest of some of the parties concerned, and they were in
conformance with the legal procedure provided in the Sher-
man Act. In May 1938 the Department instituted similar
proceedings, this time in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana. The grand jury re-
14Ibid.,p.7.
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turned indictments against manufacturing companies, offi-
cials and finance companies on May 27, 1938.
The Ford Motor the Chrysler Corporation and
their associated finance companies were still willing to
cuss consent decrees, and in order to provide a basis for them
the Department of Justice instituted proceedings before the
same court sitting in equity. As a result the government and
the respondent companies consented to decrees which were
issued November 15, 1938, effective March 15, 1939.16 Mean-
while the contract between Chrysler Corporation and Com-
mercial Credit Company had been canceled, the motor com-
pany's stock in the finance company had been sold, and it
had been announced, in April 1938, that "Chrysler Cor-
poration has no interest in and no contractual relations with
any finance company." Similarly, it was announced, in De-
cember 1938, that Commercial Investment Trust Corpora-
tion had purchased the outstanding minority stock of Uni-
versal Credit Corporation, thus making the latter a wholly
owned subsidiary of the former and divesting Ford Motor
Company from any financial interest in the company.
General Motors Corporation refused to sign a consent de-
cree and the case against that organization was prosecuted in
the fall of 1939. A verdict of guilty was returned against the
four corporate defendants (General Motors Corporation,
General Motors Sales Corporation, General Motors Accept-
ance Corporation and General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion of Indiana) though the seventeen individual defendants
—officers and agents of these corporations—were acquitted.
The convicted corporate defendants, however, have filed no-
tice of intention to appeal, thus leaving the issues of the case
still pending.
The Department of Justice hoped to reach three objectives:
16U.S. v. Ford Motor Company, et at., District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Indiana, Civil Number S.U. S.v. Chrysler
Corporation, et al., District Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Indiana, Civil Number 9.COMPETITIVE RELATIONS 273
the first was to eliminate any existing coercion of dealers by
the manufacturers and their related finance companies in-
tended to induce dealers to use the related companies; the
second was to eliminate rnanufacturer discrimination
against independent finance companies by practices concern-
ing wholesale financing (such as providing office space at the
factory for representatives of the related company, or ac-
cepting payment directly from the related company for the
cars it financed for the dealer, though not allowing the dealer
this convenience in regard to the services of any other com-
pany); and the third was to eliminate from purchaser pay-
ments to dealers or finance companies any excess amount
intended for bonuses or packs or for reserves which are
actuarily larger than necessary to cover losses. This ob-
jective cannot be achieved until the GMAC case is settled,
but the first two were covered in the provisions of the consent
decrees.
According to these provisions both manufacturer and
finance company are to leave the dealer complete freedom
to patronize any finance company he chooses. But although
the manufacturer shall not recommend any specific finance
company to his dealers Or to the public, he can draw up his
own new-car financing plans, recommend them to dealers,
advertise them and arrange for one or more finance com-
panies to make the plans available to
to
tocertain privileges hitherto reserved for the pre-
ferred company (such as office space at the factory, infor-
mation concerning dealers, financing plans which give the
finance company a competitive advantage through various
manufacturer services or facilities) he is allowed to exclude
"unregistered" companies.
A company that wishes to be regarded as "registered" is
required to file with the court a statement, addressed to a
particular manufacturer, agreeing to abide by certain regu-274 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
lations in acquiring retail automobile instalment paper from
that manufacturer's dealers. These regulations include pro-
visions that the finance company, if it arranges for insurance,
shall send to the purchaser, within 25 days after its acquisi-
tion of the contract, an insurance policy or certificate stating
the coverage and the amount of premium; that it will not
require or accept wage assignments or garnishments in col-
lection of deficiency judgments on retail cars sold for less
than $1000 unless it has requested the customer to surrender
the car and he has not done so; that it shall take no defi-
ciency judgment if the retail purchaser has paid at least 50
percent of his note; that its delinquency fees, its charges for
extending or refinancing a contract, and its charges for col-
lection or repossession shall conform with certain stated
limitations; and that it shall not require dealers to take any
collateral in addition to the car sold. As yet no finance com-
pany has registered.
The decrees signed by Chrysler and Ford and their related
finance companies provide also that the manufacturer may
not pay a subsidy to a finance company for the purpose of
enabling or inducing it to offer his dealers lower finance
charges unless he offers to pay similar subsidies to all finance
companies offering the same finance charge, and finance com-
panies are prohibited from paying money to a manufacturer
in return for business acquired from his dealers. The manu-
facturer cannot lend money to or buy the securities of any
finance company unless the outcome of the General Motors
case is such that General Motors Corporation is not required
to give up all ownership and control of GMAC.
If the prosecution of General Motors is ultimately suc-
cessful the decrees will be subject to reconsideration, if the
respondent companies request it, so that the requirements
imposed on Chrysler, Ford and their preferred finance com-
panies may be redraf ted to conform with those imposed upon
General Motors Corporation and GMAC. If the case againstCOMPETITIVE RELATIONS 275
General Motors is finally terminated with any result other
than a judgment of conviction, all provisions of the consent
decrees shall become inoperative.'7
Thus the manufacturer's interest in the sales financing
process is so strong that it has raised the question of anti-
trust act violation. But this factory influence in the business,
though it both contributes to and results from imperfect
competition, is not to be taken as an explanation of high
charges and above-average profits. On the contrary, the main
reason for the manufacturer's interest has been his desire to
see that consumers are granted attractive rates for the time
purchase of his cars. His cooperation with the finance com-
pany for this purpose was made possible by his existent con-
tractual relations with a large body of dealers—a group vital
not only to his own but also to the finance companies'
interests.
THE DEALER'S INTEREST AS A COMPETITIVE
FACTOR IN AUTOMOBILE FINANCING
The importance of the retail dealer to the finance company
derives from the fact that he is the one through whom it ac-
quires its paper. The purchaser may occasionally make his
own financing arrangements, or insist that the dealer finance
his contract through a particular agency, but in the great
majority of cases ignorance and inertia lead the consumer to
accommodate himself to the finance plan offered by the
dealer, whatever the agency with which it originated.
This strategic position of the dealer, which makes him,
rather than the purchaser, the focus of finance company ef-
17Itmay be mentioned that the Federal Trade Commission's proposed
trade practice rules for the automobile industry contain provisions stipu-
lating it to be an unfair trade practice for any member of the industry to
coerce another "to dispose of sales finance contracts to a specific finance
company ... orto specify or accept insurance through a specific insurance
company, with the effect of thereby substantially lessening competition."
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forts to obtain business, has led to many competitive practices
which pertain only to him. Some of these practices—particu-
larly the arrangements in regard to wholesale financing and
in regard to responsibility for losses—have no direct bearing
on the interests of the consumer; but other practices—par-
ticularly the arrangements concerning packs, reserves and
bonuses—are directly reflected in what the consumer pays for
the financing service.
The manufacturer demands cash for the cars shipped to
his dealers, and many dealers, not being able to finance with
their own capital the number of cars they need for display
and stock purposes, meet the factory's requirements through
wholesaleloans.Salesfinancecompaniesextend them
credit for 90 percent or 'more of the wholesale value of the
cars.
When it finances the wholesale requirements of dealers
the finance company ordinarily receives title to the car di-
rectly from the manufacturer, and a trust receipt, chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract from the dealer, who
takes physicalpossession.Ifthe same finance company
finances also the retail instalment sale of the car, it retains
title, under a new instrument, until the payments are com-
pleted. This is obviously the most convenient arrangement
in regard to the amount of clerical work involved. Questions
and 'paper work concerning title to the car are minimized,
and payments on retail deals can be applied directly to liqui-
date wholesale loans. The independent companies' complaint
that the dealer is not allowed this convenience except in deal-
ings with factory-related companies has already been dis-
cussed, and also the provisions of the consent decrees which
were intended to remedy the situation. On this type of busi-
ness the most common charge made by finance companies
during recent years has been a rate of 6 percent per annum.
Early in 1939 a 4 percent rate was introduced, and at this
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panies, because the rates currently paid by finance conIpanies
themselves on their short-term borrowings range from 3/4per.
cent, on paper sold in the open market, to as high as 8 percent
for money borrowed. directly from banks.'8 When losses and
the expenses of handling the loans and taking periodical in-
ventories of the cars are considered it is obvious that only
those companies which are able to borrow at low rates can
extend wholesale accommodations at 4 percent and not lose
money. No company can be making much profit on the
wholesale business and others must be taking it at a loss.
The importance of wholesale business is not in its profits,
however, but in its serving as a lever for obtaining retail
business from the dealer. It is a part of the total service the
finance company extends in order to induce dealers to sell
them retail contracts, which are profitable. The inducement
may be the mere fact that it is more convenient for the dealer
to do business with only one finance company, but as has
already been indicated the dealer has sometimes been re-
quired—by manufacturer as well as finance company—to
give the latter his retail business as a condition for receiving
the favorable wholesale plan. The relatively low rate on
wholesale financing is compensated by the relatively high
rate on retail business. And since wholesale, financing is a
service extended on all cars, the instalment purchaser at pres-
ent is paying, among other things, for a service extended to
the dealer on cars eventually sold for cash.
Ordinarily an appreciable amount of the dealer's capital,
which he could well use in other ways, is tied up in used
cars. Many companies will make advances on these cars, pend-
ing their resale, but some frown on the practice. The used-
car loan is in one sense the counterpart of new-car wholesale
financing, but from the viewpoint of the lending agency there
18Thisisthe range within which the bulk of the loans are made. In
isolated instances lower and higher rates will be found. This information
was compiled from data received from approximately 200 commercial banks
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is a good deal of difference between the two. The value of
the collateral is much more difficult to ascertain in used-car
than in new-car loans, and therefore greater risks are involved.
This, along with the fact that the unit amounts involved are
smaller, results in higher expenses than in new-car wholesale
financing. If finance companies keep within the limits im-
posed by the usury laws the rates they can charge compared
with the expenses involved make the business unattractive.
Used-car loans, like the wholesale financing of new cars,
are principally a means of attracting the dealer's retail busi-
ness. The companies not providing this service for the dealer
have nothing with which to meet such competition directly,
but they contend that the total service they extend is more
advantageous to the dealer than the total service, including
used-car financing, extended by their competitors.
In the early days of automobile instalment financing, be-
fore 1920, most of the paper was purchased with full re-
course on the dealer in case of default. As an increasing pro-
portion of his sales came to be made on the instalment basis
this contingent liability became a continual threat to his
solvency, and the finance company found itself in the posi-
tion of protecting its own interests at the expense of its cus-
tomers, the dealers, who were crying for relief. The result
was the development of the repurchase plan about l920.'°
This plan relieves the dealer of his recourse endorsement on
the instalment contract but provides, through a general
agreement covering all his relations with the finance com-
pany, that if repossession becomes necessary he will pay the
balance of the purchaser's obligation, with, however, certain
stipulated exceptions (referring mainly to cases of conversion,
confiscation and collision). Later the non-recourse plan was
developed by certain smaller companies which, in an effort
19See Chapter 4, p. 116. For a more detailed account of this development
previous to 1927 see E. R. A. Seligman, The Economics of Instalment Selling
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to obtain business, were willing to offer the dealer complete
freedom from responsibility.
In regard to these dealer arrangements there is a clear, but
by no means rigid, difference in policy between the larger
and the smaller companies. The nationals usually purchase
paper from dealers under the repurchase plan, but with the
exception of GMAC they also buy some paper without re-
course, one national company following one plan with some
dealers and the other plan with other dealers. The regionals
and locals most of their business without recourse,
but many of them buy a sizable percentage of their paper
under repurchase agreements, and all of them buy some
paper in this way. As a rule they buy the better-quality paper
without recourse, and take the more questionable business
on a repurchase arrangement. Data on 32 large locals show
that in 1937, when they handled a retail automobile business
of these companies purchased 35 percent of
their new-car paper and 45 percent of their used-car paper
(40 percent of their total retail automobile paper) under re-
course or repurchase agreements.2°
The proponents of the repurchase agreement contend that
the responsibility thus placed on the dealer causes him to
be more discriminate in his selling of automobiles on the
instalment plan, and that the result is a better credit situa-
tion than would exist if the paper were purchased on a non-
recourse basis. The non-recourse companies, on the other
hand, contend that they are close enough to the circumstances
surrounding each deal to form an adequate judgment con-
cerning the creditworthiness of the purchaser without the
guarantee of the dealer.
Dealers selling their paper to repurchase and to non-
recourse companies have not such a difference in losses as
20These figures include a small amount of paper classifiedas"partial
recourse" by 10 companies. Data obtained from the National Credit Office,
inc., relating to companies using the commercial paper market; companies
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might be thought. The great majority of notes are collected
without repossession, and on these no one loses. On the con-
tracts of purchasers whose credit standing is doubtful from
the beginning, even non-recourse companies typically require
endorsement with recourse. As to the repossessions that do
occur under repurchase agreements, there is often room for
a difference of opinion in determining the extent of the
dealer's stipulated exemption, and this difference must be
settled by administrative decision of the finance company's
representative after discussion with the dealer. It is frequently
advisable to favor the dealer in such decisions, and if this is
done he does not pay as much as a strict interpretation of the
agreement would require. Thus, at least in relatively pros-
perous times, the two methods of purchasing paper have not,
in themselves, very different effects; in times of depression,
when the repossession ratio is higher, a greater difference
may be expected.
The development of these plans has been accompanied,
however, by practices which constitute a highly important
aspect of sales finance company competition for dealer busi-
ness and which have a direct bearing on the interests of the
consumer, and therefore of the manufacturer. These are the
payments made to dealers in the form of reserves, bonuses
and packs.
In the middle 1920's companies purchasing paper with
full recourse endorsements or under repurchase agreements
introduced the dealer's reserve in order to protect the dealer
against losses arising from repossessions and thus meet the
growing competition of companies offering non-recourse
plans. An amount equaling a certain percentage of the cus-
tomer's original unpaid balance, regarded as part of the
finance charge, was set aside as a reserve for the dealer, to
be used in cases of repossession loss; when this reserve ex-
ceeded an agreed-upon percentage of the outstanding amount
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difference. The non-recourse companies were now at a dis-.
advantage and countered by offering dealers a bonus for their
business. The bonus also was computed on the original un-
paid balance, and included in the finance charge. Both the
reserve and the bonus provided a source of income to dealers,
and some provided themselves with further income by ar-
bitrarilyincreasing thefinance charge;thisadditional
amount, the "pack," was paid by the customer as part of his
debt, and given the dealer by the finance company.
The resultant situation is clearly unsatisfactory for the
finance companies as well as for the consumer, but, as was
indicated in Chapter 9, attempts to remedy it have met with
little success, at least partly because the problem of dealer
payments is closely connected with the larger problem of
manufacturer affiliation with the sales finance process. Most
of the non-recourse business has been conducted by inde-
pendent companies, using this plan of operation as a com-
petitive device against companies that have received factory
help in acquiring dealers' paper. The independent com-
panies have contended that the dealer's reserve allowed by
the larger companies is greatly in excess of the amount
needed to cover actual losses, and that therefore they too are
justified in allowing the dealer a special benefit, in the form
of the bonus. They also maintain that if it were not for this
inducement dealers would sell their lower-risk paper to the
companies offering repurchase plans and would sell only
higher-risk paper to the non-recourse companies.
Toleration of the pack has also been justified as a com-
petitive necessity, but if this is the case the practice appears
to have defeated its own ends, for packing is permitted by
practically all companies. And even where the dealer is not
permitted to pack the finance charge he has sometimes
achieved about the same result by packing the cash selling
price, a procedure over which the finance company has no
control. This latter practice has recently been made difficult,282 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
however, by factory requirements that the dealer stipulate
to the customer all the component items in the price of his
car.
Data on these various payments, classified according to the
companies' factory relationships and expressed in percent of
total insurance and finance charges, were presented in Chap-
ter 8. It was shown there2' that in 1936-38, according to the
samples collected by the Federal Trade Commission, the
packs allowed by factory-preferred companies took, on the
whole, a larger fraction of total charges than did those al-
lowed by the other companies: For all companies approxi-
mately one-tenth of the average insurance and finance charge
on new cars—and a somewhat larger fraction on used cars—
went to dealers for reserve or bonus.
It is not possible to determine with any accuracy whether
the amounts allowed for dealer loss reserves are indeed ex-
cessive, for cyclical and geographical variations make this an
extremely complicated problem. The Federal Trade Com-
mission attempted an analysis of the question22 but was un-
able to obtain sufficient information for reliable results. In
the end it felt justified in stating only that "there is a certain
amount of evidence that the amounts allowed as dealer's loss
reserves do exceed somewhat the average lossratio."
If in all cases the reserve were exactly sufficient to cover
losses incurred by dealers which they would not have incurred
under the non-recourse plan, its effect would be simply to
equalize the attractiveness of the two types of plans in the
eyes of the dealer. In so far as the reserve is greater than this
it is, like the bonus and the pack, a subsidy or commission
paid to the dealer for his business.
There is no doubt that the amounts of these increments
vary considerably as between different finance companies,
and even as between different transactions. And apparently
21Chapter8, Table 54.
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one reason for this variation is that some finance companies,
in their competition for dealers' business, have relied more
on factory relationships than on these special financial ar-
rangements. But in any case, all these increments are paid
by the purchaser of the car, through increased finance charges.
It is possible that in cases involving a trade-in the dealer
passes on to the customer at least a part of his bonus, reserve
or pack, in the form of a larger trade-in allowance than he
would have extended had he not expected to receive a part
of the finance charge on the deal. It is difficult, however, to
ascertain whether this has been done in any particular trans-
action, for individual used cars have no standard trade-in
price. Moreover, a large trade-in allowance, gTanted the cus-
tomer as a special inducement, may be the cause rather than
the result, of a dealer's pack.
As has been the Department of Justice hopes
to eliminate all payments that are of the nature of a subsidy,
and limit the dealer's reserve to an amount no larger than
necessary to cover actual losses. But in the meantime these
dealer payments have become entrenched as a highly im-
portant aspect of sales finance company competition, and
as a problem with a direct bearing on the interests of the
consumer.
COMPETITIVE RELATIONS IN DIVERSIFIED
FINANCING
In diversified financing, too, the manufacturer's interest has
an important effect on competitive relations. Since this field
is so extensive and so miscellaneous far more manufacturers
are involved, though none of them conducts a business so
large as that of any of the "big three" in automobiles. Some
manufacturers have close relations with preferred finance
companies, but much mOre often than in automobile financ-284 SALESFINANCE COMPANIES
ing the manufacturer has his own financing subsidiary or
department.
Again the independent companies complain that the man-
ufacturers coerce dealers to give their business to the related
finance companies, that they discriminate against the inde-
pendents in favor of the related companies, and that they
are sometimes more liberal with terms and charges than they
would be if they were not interested in the manufacturing
profit to be made by extending the market for their goods.
It is contended, for example, that electric power companies,
in their desire to increase their power loads, extend over-
liberal terms in financing the purchase of electric appliances,
and are able to absorb their repossession losses by charging
them against the profits from their total business instead of
against the profits from the financing business alone.
Government agencies (Electric Home and Farm Authority
and Federal Housing Administration) have also had an in-
fluence on the com•petitive situation in diversified financing.
The competitive importance of FHA, in its insurance of
financial institutions against losses on certain types of loans,
has been mainly in the fact that it has encouraged banks to
enter the field of diversified sales financing. EHFA, which is
specifically in the sales finance business, has served to focus
attention on the question of terms, for its charges are lower
and its contract terms are on the whole more liberal than
those characteristically made by private agencies in the same
field.
In diversified financing there has not been such a wide-
spread standardization of contract terms as has developed in
regard to automobiles, and therefore low down payments and
long contracts are of more importance as competitive devices
than they are in automobile financing. The dealers who can
offer financing facilities under the more liberal contract terms
have obviously a significant sales advantage.
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basis,and dealers' reserves are in common use. Sometimes,
however, especially in regard to refrigerator paper, dealer re-
course is limited to the period of four or six instalment pay-
ments, though with various stipulated exceptions. Packs are
allowed by some companies, though the practice is generally
frowned on.
The purchaser has ordinarily been required by the terms
of the contract to assume the risk of loss from fire, theft and
other special causes. If insurance is required it has bee.n
placed in some instances by the dealer, in others by the
finance company and in others by the purchaser himself, the
cost being separate from the finance charge. EHFA, however,
and also, since 1939, certain of the national sales finance
companies that conduct diversified financing provide insur-
ance themselves, without special charge to the customer. If
this practice proves to be an effective competitive measure
other companies may have to follow suit, but in general
insurance has not been such an important consideration in
diversified as in automobile financing.
COMPETITIVE RELATIONS WITH OTHER
CONSUMER CREDIT AGENCIES
This summary description suggests answers, though neces-
sarily complex ones, to the question why competition among
sales finance companies has not developed in such a way as
to bring about a lower level of charges, and ultimately of
profits. Not so complex is the further question as to why
other credit agencies have not attempted to share in the
profits of the sales finance business.
The answer is that to a considerable extent this is now
happening. In recent years sales finance companies have met
increasing competition from other consumer credit agencies,
both in the form of new institutions entering the sales financ-
ing field itself and in the form of new rivalry from alterna-286 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
tive methods of consumer instalment financing. Commercial
banks and industrial banking companies have actively sought
not only to obtain a larger share of the retail dealer's financ-
ing business but also to reach the prospective commodity
purchaser directly, thus entirely eliminating the dealer's role
in the credit transaction. This latter form of competition in-
heres also in the activities of personal finance companies,
which make cash loans direct to consumers. How acutely the
sales finance business feels this competition of other con-
sumer credit agencies is difficult to say; inter-agency compe-
tition is reportedly keen today in some regions and poten-
tially it is keen in all. It does not appear to have resulted in
an absolute decline of sales finance company business, but
there is some basis for inferring that the sales finance com-
panies' relative share of the consumer credit market has suf-
fered somewhat of a contraction.
In acquiring retail instalment business some banks concen-
trate their efforts on the consumer, and others consider it
more desirable to establish contacts with dealers. The latter
method of acquisition is likely to result in a quicker devel-
opment of volume, but the building up of direct consumer
relationships is believed by some bankers to make for a more
secure basis of business.
When banks attempt to reach the consumer directly the
sales finance companies can meet their competition only as
they meet that of direct cash lenders—by going directly to
the consumer, that is, by advertising. One or the other com-
petitor may experiment with a reduction in rates, and it may
be because of this competitive situation between banks and
sales finance companies that a somewhat lower level of charges
has prevailed in recent years, though it is not possible to
say whether the decrease is the result of bank or of finance
company leadership.
When the dealer is the focus of the banks' efforts to ob-
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panies attempt to maintain their position. The loss reserve,
the bonus or other finance charge participation allowed the
dealer is of course a strong competitive weapon, and one of
the most customary ways in which the finance company at-
tempts to meet the bank's competition is by offering the
dealer a more substantial participation. Also, the finance
company may emphasize its willingness to take all the rea-
sonable paper offered by a dealer, thus capitalizing on the
fact that some banks are willing to finance only the best-
quality notes. The finance company's willingness to accept
a dealer's wholesale paper is a strong talking point in some
cases, for not all banks will extend the dealer this service.
Finally, the handling of insurance may serve as a useful
competitive weapon. Since the sales finance company, in
contrast to the bank, usually places all insurance with the
same company it can emphasize to its dealers its ability to
divert repair business in their direction. In the states on the
west coast, however, it is• possible for the bank, which is pre-
vented by law from acting as an insurance agent, to arrange
for the dealer to participate in the commission on insurance,
and in automobile financing thismay be a serious threat to
the sales finance company's customary procedure and even
to its competitive position; In this connection it is interesting
to note the report that Motors Insurance Corporation allows
the dealer a commission on the insurance he writes; this is
the new company which GMAC organized late in 1939 and
which now conducts business at manual rates on the Pacific
coast, where dealers may be licensed as agents, and where
bank competition is especially keen.
A more difficult type of competition for the sales finance
company to meet is the direct cash loan to a prospective
commodity purchaser. This kind of instalment credit is ex-
tended mainly by the personal loan departments of commer-
cial banks, by industrial banking companies and by personal
finance companies. Sales finance, companies have recently at-288 SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
tempted to counteract the loan promotion activities of cash
lenders by means of national advertising and circulars to
customers affirming the superiority of sales finance company
services over those of other credit sources.
The strategic position of the dealer in the extension of
retail instalment credit has already been abundantly empha-
sized. All competing sales finance agencies receive at least
some of their paper—usually most or all of it—direct from
the dealer, and therefore, as has been shown, competitive
practices are likely to center around him more than around
the consumer. But frequently the dealer enters the field him-
self, and to the extent that he does this he becomes a for-
midable competitor of all the competitors. In automobile
retailing, the high unit value of the good prevents dealers
from any extensive financing of their own instalment paper;
probably no more than 10 percent at the outside is carried
by dealer capital. In other retail fields, however, such as
furniture, household appliances and equipment, jewelry and
"soft" goods, dealer capital may finance a large proportion of
instalment sales. There is no doubt that the high profits
•which have characterized consumer financing are an incentive
to the dealer to provide his customers with this service with-
out resort to an outside agency.
Against this form of competition the various agencies of
sales finance credit can do little, but though their share of
the market may be curtailed by some. of the larger retailers,
it is not likely that their function will be replaced. For they
have all the advantages of specialization: greater capital re-
sources available for a specific purpose; an organization
geared to the procedures required; and, especially important,
a valuable store of experience in regard to the intricate prob-
lems of contract terms and finance charges. The extent to
which the sales finance company excels its institutional com-
petitors in these respects is probably the best indication of
the extent to which it will withstand their rivalry.